Memo in Opposition to South Carolina Senate Bill 255

The members of Media Coalition believe that Senate Bill 255 violates the Constitution. They have asked me to explain their concerns. The trade associations and other organizations that comprise Media Coalition have many members throughout the country, including South Carolina: publishers, booksellers and librarians, producers and retailers of recordings, films, home video and video games.

S.B. 255 would require anyone who has published to a website the arrest and booking records to remove them within 30 days upon written request by the person the information refers to, if that person was not convicted. If the person is convicted of a lesser offense, the publisher must change any published information to reflect the reduced charge and remove any reference to the original charge. Arrest and booking information includes booking photos, date of birth, date of arrest, and the name of the arresting law enforcement agency. A violation of the law is subject to a $500 fine, 30 days in jail, or both. The publisher is also subject to a civil cause of action.

This legislation asks publishers to erase or alter history by scrubbing their published stories. Important historical events would be rewritten if a law such as this was in place. O.J. Simpson could force any website to take down his arrest information since he was acquitted in the death of his wife. Lee Harvey Oswald’s estate could ask that his arrest information be removed from websites since law enforcement did not pursue his prosecution after he was killed in police custody. John Hinckley’s legal guardian could force information about him to be removed since he was found not guilty by reason of insanity of attempting to assassinate President Reagan. It would also force online news sites to alter history. A website can publish arrest information about Justin Bieber’s arrest last year for driving while impaired but would have to edit, as if it did not happen, if he enters a diversionary program or is convicted of a lesser offense.

All speech is presumptively protected by the First Amendment against content-based regulation, subject only to specific historic exceptions. As the Court recently explained:

From 1791 to the present, . . . [the First Amendment has] “permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas.” [These] “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar[ ]”[ ] includ[ ] obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct . . .

Any content-based regulation that does not fit into a historic exception to the First Amendment must satisfy strict constitutional scrutiny. See, U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826-7 (2000). To meet the test for strict scrutiny the government must (1) articulate a legitimate and compelling state interest; (2) prove that the restriction actually serves that interest and is “necessary” to do so (i.e., prove that the asserted harms are real and would be materially alleviated by the restriction); and (3) show that the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See, R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395-96; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664-65 (1994) (state interest must actually be served by challenged statute); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991). It must also show that the legislation is not unconstitutionally overbroad. It is very unlikely that this legislation could satisfy the strict scrutiny test.

Privacy is an important right but the Supreme Court has held that it is not a sufficiently compelling interest to overcome the First Amendment right to free speech. The Court has often struck down laws and vacated court orders that barred speech about a criminal proceeding in order to protect a defendant’s privacy. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Supreme Court struck down a statute allowing a rape victim to seek damages for the publishing of his or her name. Justice White wrote, “At the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records.” 420 U.S. 469, 496. The Court again found the First Amendment right to publish outweighed privacy interests when it struck down a West Virginia law that barred publishing the name of a minor being adjudicated in juvenile court. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). See also, Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).

Nor would S.B. 255 serve the stated interest in protecting the privacy of the person entitled to ask for his or her arrest information to be removed. The image can still be published in other media despite the limitation on publication of it on the Internet, and the details of the arrest can still be published online. In Daily Mail, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, noted that the law barred newspapers from publishing the names of juveniles but did not apply to electronic communication or other publication. He then wrote, “Thus, even assuming the statute served a state interest of the highest order, it does not accomplish its stated purpose.” 443 U.S. at 105.

The differential treatment of online publishers by itself may cause S.B. 255 to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has allowed media to be treated differently in some contexts but not where the different treatment is based on the content of the speech. It has condemned the selective imposition of a penalty imposed on one medium but not others or specific segment of a medium but not others. See, United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 812 (2000) (striking down a regulation that targeted “adult” cable channels, but permitted similar expression by other speakers); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 659 (1994) (“Regulations that discriminate among media … often present serious First Amendment concerns.”) “Selective taxation of the press — either singling out the press as a whole or
targeting individual members of the press — poses a particular danger of abuse by the State.” *Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland*, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987).

Finally, this legislation likely also violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution which reserves to Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. The law would apply to anyone who posts arrest information of a person arrested and booked in South Carolina. Since websites have no ability to prevent South Carolinians from accessing their website, this law would, in effect, apply nationally to any publisher who ran an AP story about an arrest in the state. Courts across the country have repeatedly struck down state laws that seek to regulate online content as unconstitutional burdens on interstate commerce. As a leading case applying the Commerce Clause to the Internet explained:

> The courts have long recognized that certain types of commerce demand consistent treatment and are therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national level. The Internet represents one of those areas; effective regulation will require national, and more likely global, cooperation. Regulation by any single state can only result in chaos, because at least some states will likely enact laws subjecting Internet users to conflicting obligations.


If you would like to discuss our concerns further, I would welcome that opportunity. I can be reached at 212-587-4025 #3 or horowitz@mediacoalition.org.

We ask you to protect the First Amendment rights of all the people of South Carolina and defeat or amend S.B. 255.

Respectfully submitted,

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